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I.

INTRODUCTION

The current federal transfer tax system' does not work well.
Tax scholars are currently arguing about its fate. Some scholars
argue that federal transfer taxes should be strengthened and used
as a revenue source.' Others argue that federal transfer taxes cannot possibly raise significant amounts of revenue, but instead
should be strengthened and retained to bolster overall progressivity.' Still others argue that federal transfer taxes should be completely abolished because they fail to achieve their goals.4 Despite
the disagreement over the fate of the transfer tax system, scholars
universally agree that the current transfer tax system does not work
well.'
* Associate in the St. Louis office of Husch & Eppenberger. B.S.B.A., Washington
University; J.D., St. Louis University; C.P.A. certificate holder. Thanks to Professors
Katherine Pratt and Barry Cushman for their comments on earlier drafts. Special
thanks to my parents, Allen andJoanne Erblich, whose unending love, support, encouragement, and tutelage made this Article possible.
I For purposes of this Article, the term "federal transfer tax system" includes subtitle B of Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "Code")-i.e., the estate
tax, the gift tax, and the generation-skipping transfer tax.
2 E.g., G.P. Verbit, Do Estate and Gift Taxes Affect Wealth Distribution?, TR. & EST.,
Oct. 1978, at 598.
3 E.g., Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259

(1983).
4 Joel C. Dobris, A Brieffor the Abolition of All Transfer Taxes, 35 SYRACUSE L. Rxv.
1215, 1218 (1985);John E. Donaldson, The Future of Transfer Taxation: Repeal, Restructuring and Refinement, or Replacement, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 539 (1993); Charles 0.

Galvin, To Bury the Estate Tax, Not to PraiseIt, 52 TAX NOTES 1413 (1991); Robert B.
Smith, Burying the Estate Tax Without ResurrectingIts Problems, 55 TAx NOTES 1799, 1811
(1992).
Australia has already repealed its transfer tax system. See William H. Pedrick, Oh
to Die Down Under! Abolition of Death and Gift Duties in Australia, 35 Tax LAw. 113 (Fall
1981). Likewise, Canada has repealed its transfer tax system. Thomas A. Robinson,
The Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes-A Requiem?, 1 Am.J. TAx POL'Y 25, 43 (1982).
Significantly, Representative Christopher Cox (R-California) introduced H.R.
2717 on July 23, 1993, which would repeal the estate and gift tax and the tax on
generation-skipping transfers.
5 E.g., Robinson, supra note 4, at 43 ("Also clear from the history of the wealth
transfer taxes is the simple fact that while the taxes are sound in theory, they have not
worked well in practice."). Professor Robinson stops just short of calling for transfer
tax repeal, however. Instead, he argues for their retention so that we may better un-
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This Article will examine the main arguments both for repealing and retaining the federal transfer tax system. I conclude that
the federal transfer tax should be repealed. In support, the Article
argues that the transfer tax system does not raise a significant
amount of revenue, nor does it decentralize wealth. In addition, it
is neither cost-effective, fair, economically neutral, nor simple.
Furthermore, the transfer tax system interferes with capital formation and job creation and does not increase overall progressivity in
the tax system, provide an important signaling effect, nor churn
the economy. Finally, it is not morally imperative.
The repeal of the federal transfer tax system likely will stimulate capital and job creation and obviate the need for a revenue
substitute. The Article, however, also recognizes that a revenue replacement proposal is necessary in the current political environment. Accordingly, the Article evaluates some current revenue
replacement proposals and suggests some alternatives. However,
this Article's aim is not to develop new revenue sources. It is simply to show that the federal transfer tax system is not cost-effective
and should be repealed.
Before discussing arguments for repealing or reforming the
federal transfer tax system, a brief history of the tax is appropriate.
Federal transfer taxes began in 1916 in the form of an estate tax.6
The tax was originally designed to meet the revenue needs of
World War I, although it was continued after the war.7 Wealthy
individuals soon discovered that they could avoid this tax through
inter vivos gifting.' In response, Congress enacted the gift tax in
1924. 9 Until 1976, changes in this transfer tax system primarily
consisted of rate adjustments.10
In 1976, Congress dramatically reformed the transfer tax system." First, Congress unified the estate and gift tax by establishing
one tax table for lifetime and deathtime transfers.' 2 Second, Congress established a unified credit against the estate and gift tax."
derstand their utility, especially in light of the fact that so few estates-one percentare affected by the tax. Id. at 43-44.
6 REGIS W. CAMPFIELD ET AL., THE TAXATION OF ESTATES, GiFTS AND TRUSTS 19911993 3 (1991).
7 Dobris, supra note 4, at 1216-17.
8 Henry J. Aaron & Alicia J. Munnell, Reassessingthe Role for Wealth Transfer Taxes,
NAT'L TAx J., June 1992, at 119, 133.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 CAMPFIELD ET AL., supra note 6, at 6-8.
12 Id.
13

Id.

1994]

BURY FEDERAL TRANSFER TAXES

1933

That credit is currently $192,800, which effectively shelters
$600,000 of wealth transfers from transfer taxation.14 Third, Congress established a tax on generation skipping transfers.15 Finally,
Congress adopted a carryover basis for inherited property.1 6 Congress retroactively repealed carryover basis in 1980.17
The tax changed significantly again in 1981.18 The 1981 reforms increased the existing per donee annual gift tax exclusion
from $3,000 to $10,000.19 The reforms also established an unlimited marital deduction so that property may pass between spouses
without incurring transfer tax. 20 Finally, the 1981 reforms reduced
the top marginal rate from seventy percent to fifty percent by
1985.21 The top rate, however, was subsequently frozen at fifty-five
percent, where it remains today.22
II.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE ABOLITION OF FEDERAL TRANSFER TAXES

A.

Federal Transfer Taxes Cannot Possibly Raise Meaningful Amounts
Of Revenue

One chief purpose of federal transfer taxes is to raise revenue. 23 However, Table 1 (reproduced below) indicates that federal
transfer taxes currently raise approximately $11 billion annually,
less than one percent of the government's total federal receipts.
Table 1 also indicates that this is not an aberration: In the past
thirty years, federal transfer tax revenue has not exceeded 2.33% of
total federal receipts. Federal transfer taxes do not raise a significant amount of revenue.
Absent wealth confiscation, the federal transfer taxes never
will raise significant amounts of revenue. 24 Estimates are that dece14 I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505 (West 1988).
15 CAMPFIELD ET AL., supra note 6, at 7-8.

16 Id. at 7.
17 Id. The chief concern with a carryover basis was that devisees would have a
difficult time determining the value of the inherited property because decedents do
not keep detailed records for most assets-e.g., a stamp collection. For an excellent
discussion of this concern, see Donald Samelson, CarryoverBasis: The Greatest Fiasco in
Federal Taxation Histoy, 59 TAX NOTES 703 (1993). For the opposing view, see Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death, 59 TAX NOTES 287 (1993).

supra note

18
19
20
21

CAMPFIELD ET AL.,
Id.
Id.

22

Id. The rate has been frozen at 55% as a deficit reduction measure.
Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX. L. REv. 223, 225

23

6, at 8.

Id.

(1956); Gerald R. Jatscher, The Aims of Death Taxation, in DEATH, TAXES, AND FAMiLY
PROPERY.
24 E.g.,

ESSAYS AND AMERICAN ASSEMBLY REPORT 40, 41 (1977).
Dobris, supra note 4, at 1217-18. Dobris states that "not enough property is
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dents transfer only $150 billion in net assets per year.21 Professor
Michael Graetz has expressed the view that, without wealth confiscation, which is politically infeasible, the highest possible effective
rate on wealth transfers would be twenty percent.2 6 Thus, an effective tax rate of twenty percent on wealth transfers would raise only
$30 billion, which would still be less than 2.2% of total federal
revenues.
Furthermore, the $600,000 exemption equivalent for wealth
transfers, whether during lifetime or at death, indicates that the
intended tax base for the federal transfer tax is wealthy individuals.
In 1991, only 53,576 federal estate tax returns were filed for decedents with estates exceeding $600,000.27 These decedents had a
combined total gross estate of $90.9 billion. 28 Thus, even if every
dollar that a decedent in this target group transferred was confiscated by the government (a political impossibility), transfer tax revenues still would not reach nine percent of total federal revenue.
If Graetz's theoretical maximum effective -tax rate was applied to
this base, estate tax revenues would only be $18 billion. Even
Graetz, in his article praising the estate tax, concludes that "[a] tax
on deathtime transfers of wealth will thus not serve as a major
source of federal revenues." 29 Simply put, federal transfer taxes
will never meet their chief goal of raising revenue. 30 The fact that
a tax has never met its chief goal of raising revenue and is clearly
incapable of ever meeting that goal is a strong argument for its
abolition.

transferred to use a transfer tax as a source of revenue, especially if the rates are not
confiscatory." Id.
25 Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REv. 69, 72 (1990);
Graetz, supra note 3, at 269 (stating that in the early 1980s, decedents transferred
approximately $120 billion annually).
26 Graetz, supra note 3, at 269 ("With any substantial exemption, plus exclusions
for certain amounts of property passing to surviving spouse or charities, a higher average effective rate seems unrealistic. The inherent limitation on bequests as a source
of revenue cannot be overcome by even a dramatic structural revision of estate and
gift taxes, such as converting to an inheritance or accessions tax, or taxing gifts and
bequests as income to the recipient...."). But see generally Ascher, supra note 25 (advocating wealth confiscation as a solution to America's deficit crisis).
27 Barry W.Johnson, Estate Tax Returns, 1989-1991, STAT. OF INCOME BuLL., vol. 12,
no. 4, Spring 1993, at 76.
28 Id.
29 Graetz, supra note 3, at 270. But see Verbit, supra note 2, at 609-11 (arguing that
transfer taxes could be a good revenue source).
30 See Eisenstein, supra note 23, at 225 (arguing that raising revenue was the tax's
chief goals).
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TABLE 1

Total Federal
Receipts
($billions)

Year
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

90.6
97.0
99.0
107.2
115.5
116.2
125.8
143.5
152.6
176.8
199.6
195.2
202.6
232.0
263.7
294.0
194.8
339.9
384.0
441.2
504.7
553.0
639.0
635.4
660.0
725.8
788.6
827.2
913.8
972.3
1,059.3
1,107.4
1,122.2

Transfer Tax
Receipts
($billions)

Transfer Tax Receipts as
a % of Total Federal
Receipts

1.4
1.8
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.6
2.8
3.0
3.1
3.1
3.6
3.7
4.6
5.4
5.1
4.8
4.9
5.6
7.2
5.2
5.5
6.5
6.9
7.5
5.8
6.0
6.4
7.0
7.2
7.6
8.9
11.6
11.0

1.55
1.86
2.02
1.96
1.90
2.24
2.23
2.09
2.03
1.75
1.80
1.90
2.27
2.33
1.93
1.63
1.66
1.65
1.88
1.18
1.09
1.18
1.08
1.18
0.88
0.83
0.81
0.85
0.79
0.78
0.84
1.05
0.98

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis as cited in Richard
E. Wagner, Federal Transfer Taxation: A Study in Social Costs 22-23 (1993).

B.

Federal Transfer Taxes Cannot Decentralize Or Redistribute Wealth
Federal transfer taxes also aim to decentralize or redistribute
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wealth. 31 Empirical data, however, indicate that federal transfer
taxes have had no discernible effect on wealth concentration. For
example, Professor Verbit found that "the latest data indicate that
the top five percent of the population hold 43.5% of personally
owned wealth, that the top .5% hold twenty-two to twenty-four percent, and that this latter concentration has remained the same
since 1949."32 Verbit concluded that "the only available data reveal
no discernible redistribution or deconcentration of personally held
wealth since 1949. Afortiori transfer taxes have had no discernible
impact on personal wealth distribution or concentration since
33
1949."
Verbit's conclusion is bolstered by recent data from estate tax
returns. An analysis of estate tax returns by the Internal Revenue
Service found that in 1986, the richest 1.6% of the population held
28.5% of the personal wealth in the United States. 34 A later analysis performed by the IRS found that in 1989, "the Nation's 'top
wealthholders' (those with gross assets of at least $600,000) represented less than two percent of the adult population. 35 Their net
worth was $4.8 trillion and accounted for between twenty-five and
thirty percent of the personal wealth in the United States. ' 36 This
analysis also found that the number of top wealthholders in the
United States actually grew 38.5% between 1982 and 1989. 3 ' The
value of these top wealthholders' net worth increased 77.6% in that
same time period.3 ' This rate more than doubles the increase in
Gross Domestic Product during this time. 39 Furthermore, people
with a net worth of at least $5 million grew from 53,000 in 1982 to
109,000 in 1989.4o This is a 133% increase in wealth in a seven-year
period.4" In short, the IRS studies indicate that wealth concentration is increasing, not decreasing, despite the federal transfer
31 Jatscher, supra note 23, at 51; Verbit, supra note 2, at 598; see S. REP. No. 144,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 124, reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 226.
32 Verbit, supra note 2, at 601.
33 Id.
34 Marvin Schwartz & Barry Johnson, Estimates of Personal Wealth, 1986, STAT. OF
INCOME BULL., vol. 9, no. 4, Spring, 1990, at 63.
35 Barry W. Johnson & Marvin Schwartz, Personal Wealth, 1989, STAT. OF INCOME
BULL., vol. 12, no. 4, Spring 1993, at 105. This study defines a top wealthholder as
someone with $600,000 or more in gross assets. "Gross assets" includes the value of all
the person's assets and is not reduced for indebtedness.
36 Id.

37 Id. at 109.
38
39
40
41

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 110.
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taxes.4 2
A June 1992 study by Henry Aaron and Alicia Munnell
agrees. 43 Their data, reproduced in Table 2 below, show that the
wealth holdings of the top 0.5% and 1% of wealthholders has actually increased from 1962 to 1989. Aaron and Munnell conclude
that "perhaps the most important fact to be gleaned from the estate tax data is that they provide no evidence of deconcentration in
the holdings of wealth (WI) during the postwar period and hint
that concentration may even have begun to increase after 1962." 44
Even Professor Graetz, in his article praising the estate tax, admits that "the estate tax has done very little to dilute the greatest
concentrations of wealth. The portion of total wealth held by the
richest one percent of wealth-holders has remained remarkably stable. They possessed roughly one-fourth of the national wealth in
every year from 1958 to 1972."" 5 Thus, each scholar who has studied the empirical data, even those favoring the estate tax, has
reached one unmistakable conclusion: federal transfer taxes do
not decentralize wealth.
Redistributing wealth is often stated as another goal of the federal transfer tax system.4 6 While this goal seems identical to the
decentralization of wealth goal, some scholars draw a distinction
between the two.4 7 The same studies and empirical data cited

above, however, indicate that wealth has not been redistributed
since the inception of the federal transfer taxes.4 8 Thus, federal
transfer taxes do not achieve their goal of decentralizing or redistributing wealth.
This conclusion is an argument for the repeal, not the reform,
of the transfer tax system. 49 One of the tax's central aims is wealth
decentralization and redistribution. That goal has never been met.
42 The argument that wealth concentration would be even greater without federal
transfer taxes is addressed in the second half of this Article. See infra notes 205-19 and
accompanying text.
43 Aaron & Munnell, supra note 8, at 123-30.
44 Id. at 125.
45 Graetz, supra note 3, at 271.
46 Jatscher, supra note 23, at 51; Verbit, supra note 2, at 598.
47 Jatscher, supra note 23, at 51.
48 Scholars proposing reform might believe that redistributing wealth is an admirable goal and that the tax should not be abandoned simply because it has not yet
achieved this. But see Dobris, supra note 4, at 1218. Professor Dobris posited that the
federal transfer tax "does not function in a meaningful way to redistribute wealth in
order to enhance the quality of life for persons with less wealth. Indeed it might be
said that no politically acceptable transfer tax system can obtain such a result." Id.
(footnotes omitted).
49 Id. at 1219. Dobris addresses this same argument and contends, as I do, that "it
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Furthermore, it never will be met. Empirical data prove that the
tax cannot possibly raise a significant amount of revenue without
wealth confiscation.5 0 If the tax cannot raise a significant amount
of revenue from "wealthy" Americans, then it cannot possibly have
a significant effect on wealth centralization and distribution. The
argument for its repeal is bolstered by the fact that the tax cannot
at present, or ever, meet its goal of decentralizing wealth.
TABLE
SHARES OF NET WORTH HELD

251

By Top

WEALTHHOLDERS,

1962-1989

Percent of
Population

1962

1983

1986

1989

0.5
1.0

24.8
32.2

24.3
31.5

23.9
31.7

28.8
37.1

C. Federal Transfer Taxes Are Not Cost-Effective
1.

Federal Transfer Tax Reform Costs Are Too High

The federal transfer tax should be abolished because the costs
of constantly reforming the system are prohibitively high,5 2 and the
taxes constantly seem to be under revision. For example, major
changes in the estate tax occurred in 1942, 1948, 1951, 1954, 1976,
1981, 1984, 1987, and 1990." Each time the transfer tax is altered,
Congress must formulate a proposal, debate the changes, entertain
lobbyists, hold hearings, interpret the new law, and educate the
private and public sectors about the law.5 4 This process involves
costs which, while not precisely calculable, are likely substantial.
is legitimate to call for the abolition of something that is not working, and has not
worked, to achieve one of its important purposes." Id.
50 For a discussion of the tax's revenue-raising deficiencies, see supra notes 23-30
and accompanying text.
51 Aaron & Munnell, supra note 8, at 126.
52 See Dobris, supra note 4, at 1220-23 (explaining the direct and indirect costs
attendant to the federal transfer tax). I am not suggesting that any tax system which
has high reform costs should be repealed. Instead, I am arguing that this tax system
does not have enough positive attributes to outweigh its high reform costs. It raises
relatively little revenue, does not significantly affect wealth concentration, is not fair,
and interferes with the economy. Thus, its high reform costs cannot be justified.
53 CAMPFIELD ET AL., supra note 6, at 4-8; see Ronald D. Aucutt, FurtherObservations
on Transfer Tax Restructuring: A Practitioner'sPerspective, 42 TAx LAw. 343, 349 n.19
(1989) (citing the August 1988 American Bar Association meeting which called upon
Congress to acknowledge the need for stability in the federal transfer tax system).
54 See Dobris, supra note 4, at 1220-21 (asserting that this process involves substantial costs).
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Two things are certain: one, if the transfer tax is continued, the
constant reform will continue; and two, if the transfer tax is repealed, no additional reform costs will be incurred.
This constant reform of the transfer tax system also wastes taxpayers' money and resources. 55 Admittedly, no estate tax plan will
reap a reward until the taxpayer dies.5 6 In times of constantly
changing transfer tax laws, however, an estate plan quickly becomes obsolete and must be reformulated several times before
death.5 ' For example, imagine a taxpayer who, in 1975, at the age
of thirty-five, paid an estate planner to devise a plan of disposition.
By 1993, when the taxpayer is fifty-three, the five most recent transfer tax changes may have forced him to change his estate plan five
times. If transfer tax reform continues at its current pace and the
taxpayer lives his expected lifetime, he may be forced to pay an
estate planner to amend his plan another five times.58 Again, while
the costs to this taxpayer and those like him are not quantifiable,
they likely are significant. A transfer tax system that raises precious
few dollars and does not meet its own goals is not worth this cost.
Thus, the high cost of constant federal transfer tax reform provides
another justification for its abolition.
2.

Federal Transfer Tax Compliance And Enforcement
Costs Are Too High

The federal transfer tax's high compliance and enforcement
costs are another justification for its repeal. 59 The Treasury Department budgeted $6.7 billion in 1992 for the enforcement of the
entire federal tax code.6 ° Unfortunately, this figure is not broken
down by the category of tax, but by function-i.e., enforcement
55 See Aucutt, supra note 53, at 344. Aucutt does not advocate the repeal of the
transfer tax system, but does state that it is a close question. Id. at 344-45. As a practitioner, he questions whether transfer taxes "are worth the trouble" in light of the
frequent changes in transfer tax law. Id. at 345.
56 Id. at 345.
57

Id.

Contrast this to income tax advice. While a taxpayer might have to seek income
tax advice each time the income tax laws are changed, at least the taxpayer sees some
benefit to the advice on the current year's income tax return. However, if the transfer
tax laws change, then the estate planning advice is obsolete and the taxpayer never
receives a benefit.
59 This argument is presented in several articles on the federal transfer tax. See,
e.g., Dobris, supra note 4, at 1221 (arguing that enforcing taxpayer compliance generates substantial direct costs that cannot be justified by a system which raises so little
revenue).
60 James L. Payne, Unhappy Returns: The $600-Billion Ripoff 59 POL'Y REv. 18
(1992) (stating that the budget was $6 billion in 1990).
58
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and assistance, processing returns and taxpayer assistance, and administration and management. 6 1 Thus, it is not possible to determine precisely the costs of administering the transfer tax system.6 2
However, if one assumes that enforcement costs vary in proportion
to the amount of revenue that a tax collects, then it would seem
that the federal transfer tax enforcement costs-less than $67 million-are negligible.
However, a study by James L. Payne, the director of Lytton
Research and Analysis, finds that most operating costs of the tax
system are borne by the private sector and thus are never reflected
in the IRS's budget.6" Payne systematically analyzes over thirty
types of burdens that the tax system places on taxpayers.6" While
he concludes that some of these costs are simply not quantifiable,
he does cite studies and surveys that quantify several costs.6 5 For
example, he cites three IRS supervised studies of tax compliance
burdens that conclude that individual tax compliance costs alone
amounted to 8.8% of individual tax revenue in 1985.66 He also
67
quantifies tax litigation costs, tax avoidance costs, and labor costs.
Payne concludes that the costs to taxpayers of complying with the
entire tax system are sixty-five percent of tax revenue raised.68
Compliance and enforcement costs for transfer taxes are arguably higher than Payne's average sixty-five percent calculation.6 9
61 Smith, supra note 4, at 1805-11 (arguing that cost effectiveness is a strong justification for repealing the federal transfer taxes).
62 Id. at 1809.
63 Payne, supra note 60.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.

Payne provides the following table to explain his calculation:
OVERHEAD COSTS OF THE

U.S.

FEDERAL

As a % of
net tax
revenue
Governmental costs
.61%
Business and Individual
24.43
compliance costs
Economic disincentive costs
33.20
Other private sector burdens,
6.78
including costs of enforcement,
forced collections, litigation,
avoidance, and evasion
Total
65.02
69 See Smith, supra note 4, at 1801-04.

TAx

SYSTEM

Amount
(in billions of dollars)
1985
1990
$4.0
159.4

$5.8
232.2

216.6
44.2

315.6
64.5

424.2

618.1
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The transfer tax system is arguably more complex than the income
tax system.7" While many individuals regularly prepare their own
income tax returns, they rarely can prepare estate tax returns without expert assistance." This expert advice is costly. The transfer
tax system also generates more estate planning costs relative to the
revenue it raises than the income tax.72 Because all IRS estate tax
agents are attorneys, and therefore are paid more than other IRS
agents, it is also reasonable to assume that the IRS's enforcement
costs per dollar of revenue generated for transfer taxes exceeds
that of the income tax.7 3 In addition, the IRS must hire highpriced valuation experts to litigate estate tax audit controversies.
In short, the transfer tax system's complexity and the requisite level
of expertise (on both sides) arguably makes it more expensive (relative to the revenue raised) than the income tax system.
Using the conservative (for transfer tax purposes) sixty-five
percent estimate, the federal transfer tax's 1992 private sector costs
were $7.5 billion. Considering that transfer taxes raise only $11
billion per year, this statistic shows that the transfer tax system is
netting only $3.5 billion annually. This lack of cost-effectiveness is
a compelling argument for its repeal.
The direct transaction costs of the federal transfer tax system
are also too high.7 ' A 1973 study of estate tax returns indicated
that the total attorneys' fees which could be deducted were
$1,218,450,000. 75 This was thirty percent of the total estate tax revId. at 1803, 1811.
See Aucutt, supra note 53, at 344.
72 Id. at 345.
73 Galvin, supra note 4, at 1419. Galvin would "wager that a time and effort study
by the Service of the transfer tax system would demonstrate that greater productivity
could be achieved if [the] same resources [that are allocated to the transfer tax system]
were allocated to income tax administration." Id. This makes sense. The IRS is using
presumably some of its best and brightest agents (they must be bright if they can
figure out the transfer tax system) to collect a mere $11 billion. This is a classic example of the government inefficiently using its resources. These bright agents could be
more efficiently used if they were used to tackle problems in the income tax system.
See Dobris, supra note 4, at 1222.
Similarly, society is wasting some of its best assets by employing bright, talented
estate planners to find holes in the transfer tax system. These estate planners spend
their lives finding ways to legally avoid transfer taxes for their clients. Once they have
found the proverbial "hole in the dike," the government then plugs the hole and the
process begins again. It is a shame that such talent is being wasted on such a meaningless task. If transfer taxes were repealed, estate planners could use their intellect
to make a greater difference in society rather than to make a temporary hole in the
dike.
74 See Verbit, supra note 2, at 601.
75 Id. Verbit aptly cites a Lewis Eisenstein quote: "While it-estate and gift tax
70
71
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enue collected in 1973.76 Considering that the federal transfer tax
system has become much more complicated in the past twenty
years, it is safe to assume that these costs have increased. Furthermore, taxpayers regularly have to pay valuation experts to properly
report a decedent's assets on the estate tax returns and accountants to maintain the decedent's tax records after death.7 7 The
transfer tax system's high direct transaction costs (in relation to the
revenue that it raises) strengthens the argument that the transfer
tax system is not cost-effective.
Federal transfer taxes also may indirectly cause revenue loss
and higher enforcement costs in the income tax system.78 Transfer
taxes, designed to decentralize wealth, are targeted at the
wealthy. 79 The general public presumably knows this. Through
legal estate planning, however, most of this targeted wealth passes
without being taxed. For example, in 1986 $123 billion of wealth
was transferred, but only $36 billion appeared on estate tax returns.80 Only $7 billion was actually paid in estate taxes.8 1 This is
less than six percent of the wealth transferred. This type of legalized tax avoidance might anger the general public, who likely cannot understand the difference between legal tax avoidance
through estate planning and illegal tax evasion.8 2 In addition to
causing resentment among the general public, this might make
them more apt to try illegal tax evasion-figuring that "if the rich
can do it, I can too."83 Ultimately, this could cost the treasury
money in lost revenue and increased enforcement costs. 84 While
this indirect cost is not completely quantifiable, it does support the
notion that transfer taxes are not cost-effective and thus should be
repealed.8 5
law-helps to support many lawyers, it does relatively little to support the Government." Id. at 610 n.84 (citation omitted).
76 Id. at 610.
77 See Dobris, supra note 4, at 1221.
78 See id. at 1224 for a discussion of this indirect cost.
79 See Verbit, supa note 2, at 598.
80 See Aaron & Munnell, supra note 8, at 134.
81 RicHARD E. WAGNER, THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF TAXATION, FEDERAL TRANs-

A STUDY IN SocIAL COST 23 (1993) (citing a Department of Commerce
table totalling federal transfer tax receipts).
82 See Dobris, supra note 4, at 1224-25.
FER TAXATION:

83 Id.
84 See

Graetz, supra note 3, at 268. Professor Graetz notes that there is an increase
in evasion, avoidance, delinquency, and abusive sheltering of taxes. Id. at 268 n.60
(citation omitted). He also states that many middle class taxpayers are achieving their
tax reduction through tax fraud. Id. Finally, he notes that there is a "compliance
gap" of $75-100 billion. Id.
85 Some might contend that the middle class and poor would be more distraught

1943

BURY FEDERAL TRANSFER TAXES

1994]

D. Federal Transfer Taxes Do Not Meet Any Of The Basic Tax Policy
CriteriaFor A Worthwhile Tax
1.

The Federal Transfer Tax System Violates The Fairness
Principle

The federal transfer tax system's unfairness supports the argument for its repeal. One of the basic goals of a tax system is fairness. 6 Fairness is typically subdivided into two components:
horizontal equity and vertical equity."7 Horizontal equity requires
that similarly situated taxpayers should be taxed alike. 8 Thus, horizontal equity dictates that the transfer tax system taxes two individuals who have identical amounts of wealth and who make identical
transfers the same. The federal transfer tax system does not meet
this goal.
A simple example clearly illustrates the lack of horizontal equity in the transfer tax system. Consider two taxpayers, A and B,
each of whom has $5 million that he wants to transfer to his child,
C and D respectively. A does not visit an estate planner and simply
leaves his child, C, $5 million in cash when he dies. The estate tax
on this transfer will be $2,275,800.89 B, however, visits an estate
planner. B creates an irrevocable life insurance trust and gifts
$10,000 tax-free to this trust each year. 90 The trust then uses these
gifts to purchase a $5 million life insurance policy on B's life, naming D as the beneficiary. When B dies, the life insurance policy is
if the federal transfer tax system were repealed than if it were to continue in its leaky
state. I disagree. I believe that it angers middle-class taxpayers to watch rich taxpayers
pay their high-priced income tax planners to avoid income tax. Average taxpayers are
then further infuriated to watch these rich taxpayers pay their high-priced estate planners to devise complicated schemes to avoid transfer taxes. If the transfer tax were
repealed, the average taxpayer would not have to withstand this second round of agony. If the transfer tax system is replaced with an increased income tax and capital
gain tax rate on rich taxpayers, then the average taxpayer will be happier because
higher rates are not as easily avoided.
86 WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 19 (8th ed. 1990); DEPARTMENT

OF THE

TREASURY,

TAX

REFORM

FOR

FAIRNESS,

SIMPLICITY,

AND

ECONOMIC

GROWTH 1 (Nov. 1984) (hereinafter "TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT").
87 KLEIN ET AL., supra note 86, at 19.
88 Id.
89 I.R.C.
§ 2001 (West 1988). From the tax table, the calculation is:
$1,025,800+($2,500,000 x 50%)=$2,275,800. I am ignoring the $192,800 unified
credit for purposes of simplicity.
90 I.RC. § 2503 (West 1988). This section provides a $10,000 annual per donee
exclusion from the gift tax. Using a "Crummey" power, these gifts will be treated as
.present interests" and thus may use the $10,000 annual exclusion. See Crummey v.
Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
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not includable in B's estate and thus no transfer taxes are paid. 9 1
2
Furthermore, the life insurance proceeds are not taxable to D.1
Thus, A and B, two similarly situated taxpayers, transferred the
same amount of money but were taxed differently under the transfer tax system. Therefore, the transfer tax system violates the prin93
ciple of horizontal equity.

The federal transfer tax system also violates the principle of
vertical equity. The principle of vertical equity states that people
with a greater ability to pay taxes should pay a higher percentage of
their income in taxes.94 Thus, vertical equity dictates that people
who transfer a greater amount of wealth should pay a higher proportion of their wealth in taxes. The federal transfer tax system
does not meet this fairness goal. Instead, people who have greater
amounts of wealth to transfer simply have a greater incentive to
visit an estate planner to avoid the transfer taxes.
A simple modification of the previous example illustrates this
point. Assume that A transferred $4 million in cash to C while B,
using the irrevocable life insurance trust recommended by his estate planner, transferred $5 million in cash to D. A would pay
more transfer taxes than B even though A transferred less property
than B. This violates the principle of vertical equity because B,
with a greater ability to pay transfer taxes than A, paid less taxes
than A. Thus, the federal transfer tax system violates the principle
of vertical equity.

91 I.R.C. § 2042 (West 1988). Because B retains no "incidents of ownership" in the
life insurance policy, it is not included in his estate at death. Id.
92 I.R.C. § 101 (West 1988).
93 In addition to violating horizontal equity, this also punishes those taxpayers who
fail to visit an estate planner. It does not seem fair to me that a tax system should
punish taxpayers for not seeing a lawyer before giving money to their children. See
Aaron & Munnell, supra note 8, at 138 (averring that federal transfer taxes are "penalties imposed on those who neglect to plan ahead or who retain unskilled estate
planners").
I want to emphasize that I do not think that the federal transfer tax system should
be repealed simply because it is inequitable. Portions of the income tax are inequitable and I do not think that the income tax system should be repealed yet. Instead, I
am arguing that the transfer tax system does not have enough positive attributes to
outweigh its inherent unfairness. It does not raise a large amount of revenue, it does
not have a significant effect on wealth centralization, it is not cost effective, and it
interferes with the economy. It is also unfair. Thus, it should be repealed because its

negatives outweigh its positives and it cannot be adequately repaired.
94 KLEIN ET AL., supra note 86, at 20.
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The Federal Transfer Tax System Violates The Principle
Of Neutrality

The federal tax system's interference with the efficient allocation of resources in society supports the argument for its repeal. 9 5
The principle of economic neutrality states that an ideal tax system
should interfere with private economic decisions as little as possible.9 6 It is based on the assumption that the free market economy
results in the ideal allocation of resources. 7 Thus, this tax policy
goal conveys the idea that an optimal tax system is neutral towards
private decisions so as not to interfere with the ideal allocation of
resources achieved by the market.9 8
The federal transfer tax system violates the principle of neutrality by discouraging savings and investment that are needed for
economic growth. 9 The transfer tax system taxes savings that are
transferred.10 0 Taxpayers are aware that savings are heavily taxed
at transfer. 10 1 This knowledge gives taxpayers a negative incentive
to save and a positive incentive to consume. 0 2 However, savings is
95 WAGNER, supra note 81. Wagner's study of the social costs of the transfer tax
system focuses on the economic effects of the tax. He uses econometric models to
show that the transfer tax system actually costs America revenue, jobs, and economic
growth. He analyzes the transfer tax system from a supply sider's perspective.
96
97
98

See
Id.
Id.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT,

supra note 86, at 13.

99 See Dobris, supra note 4, at 1222; WAGNER, supra note 81, at 5-10; PAUL A. SAMuELSON & WILLIAM D. NoRDHAus, ECONOMICS 154-62 (12th ed. 1985) (stating that savings and investment, in general, is essential for economic growth). But see Graetz,
supra note 3, at 279 ("[E]mpirical findings suggest that technological advances and
population growth, rather than increases in savings, have accounted for the bulk of
economic growth.").
100 To the contrary, if one consumes all of one's wealth before one dies, then one
transfers no wealth at death and pays no estate tax.
101 See Dobris, supra note 4, at 1222.
102 See Stephen J. Entin, Clinton's PrposedEstate Tax Rate Increase: A Deadly Budget
Gimmick, in IRET BYLINE, No. 112 1 (Institute For The Research on the Economics of
Taxation, Apr. 12, 1993). This article explains that taxpayers pay no transfer tax if
they consume all of their wealth. Taxpayers only incur transfer taxes when they save
wealth and transfer it to another. Thus, they have an incentive not to save.
Federal transfer taxes are also a form of double taxation. Every dollar making up
an estate (or a gift) has been taxed or will be taxed under the income tax system.
Typically, income is taxed when first earned. If it is then consumed, it is free from
further federal tax. If it is saved, then the returns on those savings are taxed again.
However, if those savings are never consumed, then the estate tax taxes them again
when they are transferred at death-a potential third layer of tax, Milton Friedman is
reputed to have commented that federal transfer taxes send a bad message to savers:
"That it is O.K. to spend your money on wine, women, and song, but don't try to save
it for your kids." Well said.
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a positive good because it is a tool of capital formation. 103 Thus,
transfer taxation, by discouraging savings and investment, is
undesirable.
Professors Dobris, Wagner, and Graetz all acknowledge this argument against the transfer taxes. 10 4 Graetz, however, argues that
the amount of money raised by transfer taxes is too small to have a
significant impact on saving and investment (and therefore capital
formation) .105 Graetz states that its impact on savings is dwarfed by
other taxes and by monetary policy.10 6 However, Graetz fails to recognize that while the revenue collected from the tax is insignificant,
the amount of money affected by the tax is very significant. One
cannot judge the economic effect of a tax based on the amount of
revenue that it generates. The transfer tax system creates a disincentive to save for taxpayers with billions of dollars in wealth. This
disincentive exists regardless of whether those taxpayers ultimately
pay the tax or pay an estate planner to avoid the tax. In fact, one
could even argue that the tax raises so little revenue because of the
perverse incentive that it creates to consume instead of save.
Professor Wagner advances the proposition that transfer taxes
are bad because they discourage savings and investment a step further by showing that transfer taxes lower productivity, employment, and output. 10 7 His argument goes as follows: (1) federal
transfer taxes discourage savings; (2) this reduction in savings, in
turn, reduces the creation of capital; (3) this reduction in capital
reduces wages and employment because labor is less productive
when the capital stock with which it works decreases; and (4) the
lower wages and employment reduce Gross Domestic Product.1" 8
Wagner created an econometric model based on this analysis,
which reached startling conclusions. His model simulated the
economy from 1971-91 without a federal transfer tax. The model
103 See SAMUELSON & NoRDHAus, supra note 99, at 154; WAGNER, supra note 81, at 510;Dobris, supra note 4, at 1222.
104 See WAGNER, supra note 81, at 5; Dobris, supa note 4, at 1222; Graetz, supra note
3, at 279.

105 Graetz, supra note 3, at 279.

106 Id.
107 See WAGNER, supra note 81, at 5-10.
108 Id. at 10-11. Wagner explains these economic effects in detail. For example, he
uses the variable law of proportions to show that decreasing the capital-labor ratio
results in a decrease of the demand for labor. His economic analysis is beyond the
scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that his proposition supports the argument that
federal transfer taxes interfere with the efficient free-market system. Because I am
not an economist, I cannot pass judgment on his econometric analysis. I do, however, agree with his general proposition that transfer taxes reduce savings and interfere with the efficient functioning of the economy.
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shows that, as of 1991, without the federal transfer tax: (1) Gross
Domestic Product would be $46.3 billion higher; (2) 262,000 more
jobs would exist; and (3) capital would be $398.6 billion higher.10 9
The results are provided in Table 3 below.
TABLE 3
Economic Growth Without Transfer Tax, 1971-1991

Year

Change in
GDP
($billions)

Change in
Jobs
(thousands)

Change in
Capital
($billions)

1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

2.6
7.7
13.6
17.7
22.5
25.9
29.8
33.1
34.4
34.2
36.9
35.4
37.4
39.3
38.6
38.0
37.6
39.2
41.9
44.3
46.3

20
72
147
215
269
316
352
375
378
353
336
308
297
299
285
268
260
252
250
248
262

25.3
72.9
124.5
170.2
209.8
229.3
255.4
277.4
291.6
305.5
325.6
333.1
333.1
329.5
318.8
311.4
308.2
318.9
336.9
366.5
398.6

(Changes in GDP are annual; changes in capital stock are cumulative.) 1 1 o

Wagner also simulated the economic consequences of eliminating the federal transfer taxes in 1993 for the remainder of this
century. The model predicts that eliminating federal transfer taxes
in 1993 would: (1) increase Gross Domestic Product by $79 billion
more by the year 2000 than it would be with the tax; (2) increase
the stock of capital by $639 billion more than the amount projected for the year 2000; and (3) create 228,000 more jobs than if
the transfer tax remained (through the labor productivity enhanc109 Id. at 17.
110 Id. (citation omitted).
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ing effect of a larger stock of capital).1 1 1 Wagner's conclusions are
provided in Table 4 below.
TABLE 4
Economic Growth Without Transfer Tax, 1993-2000

Year

Change in
GDP
($billions)

Change in
jobs
(thousands)

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

6.6
19.3
33.2
45.6
57.5
65.7
73.0
79.2

12
44
84
128
171
203
225
228

Change in
Capital
($billions)

(Changes in GDP are annual; changes in capital stock are cumulative.)

64.5
180.8
301.4
401.6
492.6
547.7
595.8
638.9
1 12

Wagner explains the theory behind this forecast as follows:
The elimination of the tax (without its replacement by other
taxes) would have increased the after-tax rate of return on the
then existing stock of capital. The higher net return would have
induced an increase in private saving and investment above the
levels that actually occurred, and these higher levels would have
persisted until the after-tax rate of return had fallen back to its
long-term trend value. The larger stock of capital would have
increased the amount of capital used with labor services
throughout the economy, thereby increasing the productivity of
labor, hence the demand for labor services. In turn, this would
have led to an increase in employment and in113real wage rates,
hence an increase in aggregate labor income.
Wagner's study and his conclusions are, at the very least, compelling evidence that federal transfer taxes are interfering with the functioning of an efficient free-market economy. While no one, including
Wagner, can precisely quantify the adverse economic effects of the
1M1

Id. at 18.

112 Id. at 19.

113 Id. at 16. For a full description of the assumptions of the econometric model
that Wagner uses, see Appendices I and II to his study. Id. at 42-49. Basically, the
model characterizes the economy through four relationships: (1) the production sector; (2) the household sector; (3) the marginal tax rates on the factors of production
and consumption; and (4) expectations about the future. The model is extraordinarily complex: it considers over 5,000 investment series, has more than 20 capital classifications, and includes historical income from 1954-87.
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transfer tax, it is clear that such adverse effects exist and thus that the
tax violates the principle of neutrality."1
Proponents of the "Theory of Second Best" (hereinafter "Second
Best") might argue that the tax's violation of economic neutrality is
not necessarily bad."1 5 Second Best states that if a constraint is introduced into a general equilibrium situation which prevents the attainment of Pareto optimality, then the optimal equilibrium can be
achieved only by departing from other Pareto conditions.1 1 6 In other
words, if a tax (a constraint) is introduced into an efficient economy,
then the only way to reach the optimal level of output in that economy is to have another tax offset the first tax's inefficient effects.
For example, assume there are two goods in society, A and B, and
a tax is imposed on good A. 1 7 This tax on good A interferes with the
Pareto optimal level of consumption for goods A and B by raising the
price of good A relative to the price of good B. This also amounts to a
subsidy of good B, because good B's price is reduced relative to good
A's. Second Best states that the only way an optimum equilibrium can
again be achieved, given the fact that there is a tax on good A, is to
impose a tax on good B.' 1 8 This new optimal equilibrium is the second best position attainable given one tax.'1 9
Second Best further posits that:
It is not true that a situation in which more, but not all, of the
optimum conditions are fulfilled is necessarily, or is even likely
to be, superior to a situation in which fewer are fulfilled. It follows, therefore, that in a situation in which there exist many
constraints which prevent Paretian optimum conditions, the re114 No study has yet responded to Wagner's analysis. While Wagner acknowledges

that some economists might reach different quantitative conclusions than he did, he
states that his qualitative theory of the transfer tax interfering with savings and investment is widely accepted. The quantitative differences are primarily due to the
econometric model used. For example, Wagner notes that the CBO uses an old-fashioned Keynesian model which would produce smaller economic effects of repeal than
his model. Telephone Interview with Richard E. Wagner, Professor, George Mason
University (Nov. 10, 1993).
115 R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. OF
ECON. STUn. 11 (1956). A British economist,James Meade, developed this theory but
it was Lipsey and Lancaster who popularized the notion.
116 Id.
117 This example is modeled after an example given by Professor McCloskey in
DONALD N. McCLOsKEY, THE APPLIED THEORY OF PRICE 313 (2d ed. 1985).
118 Id.; Lipsey and Lancaster state it as follows: "Then all that can be said in general

is that given the existence and invariability of this tax, a second best optimum can be
achieved by levying some system of taxes and subsidies on all other commodities."
Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 115, at 12.
119 Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 115, at 12.
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moval of any one constraint may affect welfare or efficiency
120
either by raising it, by lowering it, or by leaving it unchanged.
This can be illustrated by returning to the previous example. Assume
that a tax was also imposed on good B. Proponents of Second Best
would then argue that it is not necessarily better to remove the tax on
good B if there is still a tax on good A. Second Best suggests that
.federal transfer taxes are a constraint on optimal output that should
not necessarily be removed. Second Best would posit that eliminating
the federal transfer tax system (a constraint) will not necessarily lead
to a more efficient economy because there is more than one constraint (i.e., other taxes and inefficiencies) in the American economy.
Thus, Second Best would state that removing the transfer tax constraint "may affect welfare or efficiency either by raising it, by lowering
it, or by leaving it unchanged."12' 1 Professor McCloskey best summarizes Second Best's application to tax policy: "In short, the correct
strategy for a society trying to do as well as it can given that it cannot
attain the first-best position of no taxes at all is to achieve the secondbest position attainable. This may well involve imposing taxes, not
eliminating them."12 2
The problem with Second Best is that it is not practical. 2 ' Perhaps Second Best is correct in stating that, given one tax, the optimal
level of output (the second best position) is only achieved if an equal
tax is imposed on everything else. 1 24 It may be true that only then are
1 25
the true marginal costs and valuations of goods left undisturbed.
However, this theory only works if "everything" is taxed.' 26 Everything
must include marketed and unmarketed commodities (i.e., sleep,
thought, recreation, etc. ).12'7 As Professor McCloskey points out, if
only marketed commodities are taxed, "then the taxes on vacuum
cleaners, supermarket food, and psychoanalysis would amount to subsidies on unpaid housekeeping labor, backyard gardening, and tranits
scendental meditation, and society would be pushed away from
121
commodities.
nonmarketed
and
optimal output of marketed
Applying this reasoning, Second Best's argument against transfer
tax repeal fails. America's tax system does not and cannot practically
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 MCCLOSKEY, supra note
123 Id.
124 Id.

Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
125

117, at 313.
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tax "everything." Thus, one cannot say that the only way to reach the
optimal level of output in the economy is to have the transfer tax offset another tax's inefficient effect. It simply does not follow that the
transfer tax system is returning marginal costs and valuations of
goods to their true values. Too many goods remain untaxed and cannot possibly be taxed for this to be true. Thus, Second Best, while
interesting, fails to provide a compelling reason not to repeal federal
transfer taxes.
Second Best thus does not refute Professor Wagner's theory that
transfer taxes inappropriately interfere with the economy. Some still
may quibble with Wagner's assumptions, some may quibble with his
data, some may quibble with his model, and some may quibble with
the magnitude of his economic effects.12 9 That is fine. But even if
Wagner's model is not completely accurate, it serves to illustrate an
undeniable fact: federal transfer taxes discourage savings and investment and that is bad, especially in our economic state. America simply cannot afford a tax which does not raise a significant amount of
revenue, does not effectively decentralize wealth, does not redistribute
wealth, is not very cost-effective, but does interfere with the economy.
3.

The Federal Transfer Tax System Violates The Goal Of
Simplicity

The federal transfer tax system's complexity supports the argument for its repeal. An important goal of a tax is simplicity.1 3 It is
universally agreed that the federal transfer tax system is too complex.1 3 ' The annual $10,000 per donee exclusion from the gift tax
To date, no one has challenged Wagner's study. See supra note 114.
See TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 86, at 15; Edward J. McCaffery,
The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1267, 1269. Professor McCaffery
defines simplicity in terms of "technical complexity," "structural complexity," and
"compliance complexity." See id. at 1269-72. Technical complexity refers to the
purely intellectual difficulty in understanding the meaning of a tax law. Id. at 1271.
129

130

Structural complexity refers to the difficulty in applying a tax law to one's own affairs.

Id. Compliance complexity refers to the difficulty in complying with the tax. Id. at
1272.
Applying McCaffery's definitions to the federal transfer tax system shows that it is
indeed complex. As a student of transfer taxation, I can personally attest to the fact
that it is intellectually difficult to understand transfer tax laws. Furthermore, the prevalence of estate planners shows that transfer taxes are also structurally complex.
Also noteworthy is that McCaffery concludes that a complex tax system is not
needed to ensure equity and efficiency-i.e., that trade-offs are not always necessary.
Id. at 1318-19.
131 See, e.g., Task Force on Transfer Tax Restructuring, American Bar Association,
Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring,41 TAX LAw. 395 (1988) (hereinafter "Task Force
Report"); Harry L. Gutman, A Comment on the ABA Tax Section Task Force Report on
Transfer Tax Restructuring,41 TAX LAw. 653, 660 (1988).
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for gifts of present interests in property13 2 exemplifies this complexity. This exclusion was originally created as an administrative
device "to obviate the necessity of keeping an account of and reporting numerous small gifts."1 3 3 In short, it was enacted to ensure
that taxpayers would not be required to file gift tax returns for
their Christmas and birthday gifts. Instead, the annual exclusion
has spawned massive amounts of litigation and complex tax avoidance schemes.1 34 Most of the litigation involves the complex issue
of what constitutes a "present interest."1 3 5 Even the American Bar
Association's 1988 "Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring" (hereinafter "ABA Report") acknowledged that the annual exclusion
"has led to complex rules and serious tax avoidance." i3 6
The federal transfer tax system's complexity makes it impossible for the average citizen to understand his own estate plan. The
ABA Report acknowledges this sad fact by stating that "one of the
chief complaints about the present system is that it complicates es13 7
tate planning, wills, and trust instruments, perhaps unduly."
The ABA report attaches a typical will clause to its report and concludes that "a testator, even if above average intelligence, is unlikely to understand, or if he was once told, to remember, all that
138
such a will clause is intended to accomplish."
The federal transfer tax system's complexity also makes it disingenuous. 39 Each taxpayer should be able to determine his annual tax contribution to the government. 40 This determination is
132

I.R.C. § 2503(b) (West 1988).

133 See Gutman, supra note 131, at 657-58 (quoting S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st

Sess. 41 (1932)).
134 See id. at 658.
135 See, e.g., Stark v. United States, 477 F.2d 131 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 975
(1973); Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968); Commissioner v.
Herr, 303 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1962); Georgia Ketteman Trust v. Commissioner, 86 T.C.
91 (1986); Estate of Kolker v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1082 (1983).
136 Task Force Report, supra note 131, at 401. The ABA recommended redefining
"present interest" to exclude property subject to a lapsing power of appointments. It
also suggested capping the amount that could be excluded on a per donor basis.
Finally, it advocated a de minimis per donee exclusion for small gifts. Id. at 401-04.
In my opinion, these reform suggestions do not solve the problem. Even if this
proposal were adopted, there would still be litigation over the "present interest" requirement. It does not make sense to me to simplify a complex tax area by adding
more complex restrictions. Estate planners will simply find other holes in the proverbial dike. That is what they are paid to do. I suggest that we not perpetuate this
wasteful game with complex reforms.
137 Id. at 396.
138 Id.
139 See Smith, supra note 4, at 1811.
140 Id.
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critical because it gives citizens an opportunity to make informed
voting decisions in supporting or opposing candidates or tax proposals. 14 1 The federal transfer tax system, as shown above, is so
complex that it is extremely difficult for one to determine one's
own transfer tax contribution. Furthermore, because the estate tax
is based on the value of one's assets at death, it is literally impossible for one to calculate the tax that one will owe at death. 4 2 Thus,
the federal transfer tax system is disingenuous because its complexity conceals from citizens the amount of their tax.
Furthermore, the tax is so complex that generalist attorneys
struggle to understand it. Not only does this lead to malpractice
lawsuits, but it also does not make sense to enact a tax that even
smart people cannot understand. 4 3 Those who call for its reform,
rather than its repeal, to alleviate its complexity overlook one essential fact: it has been reformed at least nine times since 1942 and
each time it has become more complex. 4 4 Taxpayers, the political
system, and the tax system can only tolerate a limited amount of
complexity.1 4 5 It seems unwise to waste that complexity on a tax
system that raises little revenue, does not decentralize wealth, does
not redistribute wealth, is not cost-effective, and is not economically neutral. The transfer tax system's overwhelming complexity
also supports the argument for its repeal.
E.

Federal Transfer Taxes Alter The Composition of Individual
Investment Portfolios

The repeal of the federal transfer tax will also foster investment in riskier ventures, which in turn will spur economic growth.
Many trusts are created simply to avoid estate taxes.14 6 The trustees
of these trusts typically invest conservatively in an attempt to preserve the trust's corpus. 4 7 By eliminating the estate tax, the
amount of money held in trusts will decrease and thus people will
141

Id.

Id.
See Dobris, supra note 4, at 1225 (arguing that the estate tax "isso complex that
estate planning is becoming, or soon will be, a fertile ground for malpractice suits
142
143

against lawyers. That is, the practice is too complex for the garden variety lawyer.
This is unwholesome and inefficient. We should not have a death tax system which is
a trap for the unwary."). See also Gerald P. Johnston, Legal Malpractice in Estate Planning-PerilousTimes Ahead for the Practitioner,67 IowA L. REv. 629, 636-43 (1982).
144 See generally Aucutt, supra note 53, at 345.
145 See Dobris, supra note 4, at 1224.
146 See id.at 1223-24 for an excellent presentation of this argument.
147

Id.
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be free to invest in riskier activities.14 8 One commentator concludes that "[p]utting money outright in the hands of people who
lead to the creaare likelier to be more adventurous investors may
149
investing."
riskier
of
way
by
wealth
new
of
tion
Some might contend that most trusts created for estate planning purposes are created by rich people who give trustees broad
investment powers. 1 50 These trusts are set up for the purpose of
seeing that wealth passes to a younger generation.5 5 Thus, the
trustee will aggressively seek investments with substantial appreciation possibilities so that the younger generation can receive even
more wealth. 15 2 This counterargument fails to acknowledge that
trustees are necessarily more risk-averse than a typical investor because they are charged with a fiduciary duty to protect the trust's
assets. An individual investor would be more willing to invest in a
risky new business venture than a trustee, because the trustee
would not want to risk losing the assets that he is bound to protect.
Thus, the elimination of the transfer taxes likely will result in fewer
trusts and riskier investment activities.
One popular estate planning technique-combining a charitable remainder trust with an irrevocable insurance trust-illustrates
how the federal transfer tax system dictates individual's investment
decisions and thereby alters the composition of investment portfolios. This estate plan is typically recommended for individuals with
estates exceeding $600,000 ($1,200,000 if married) who own highly
appreciated capital assets that they would like to transfer tax-free.
It works as follows: (1) the transferor transfers the highly appreciated capital asset (house, stock, bonds) to a special kind of irrevocable trust called a charitable remainder trust ("CRT"); (2) this
charity-owned CRT then sells the appreciated asset, but pays no
capital gains tax because the charity is tax-exempt; (3) the charitable trust reinvests the property in income-producing property and
passes this income stream to the transferor; (4) the trust gives the
assets remaining at the transferor's death to a charity and, thus, the
transferor receives a charitable deduction for the present value of
this remainder interest; (5) the transferor takes the income stream
from the CRT and makes tax-free gifts to another trust-the irrevocable insurance trust ("IIT"); (6) the IIT uses this income stream to
purchase life insurance on the transferor's life equal to the value of
148

Id.

149
150

Id. at 1223.
Id. at 1224.
Id.
Id.
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the original capital asset transferred into the CRT; and (7) upon
the transferor's death, the transferor's family receives tax-free insurance proceeds equal to the value of the assets originally transferred. The following example illustrates this method:
G owns XYZ stock worth $5,000,000. G paid $500,000 for this
stock several years ago. If G sells the stock, G will pay capital
gains tax on the $4,500,000 gain. If G does not sell the stock
and leaves it to G's family, then it will be included in G's estate
and subject to estate taxes. After talking to an estate planner, G
donates the stock to a CRT. G receives a charitable deduction
for the present value of the stock's remainder value. The CRT
then sells the stock, but pays no capital gains tax. The CRT then
invests the proceeds in bonds yielding six percent. The CRT
pays this income stream to G for the remainder of G's life. G
then creates another trust, an IIT. Using part of the CRT's income stream (as well as the tax savings from the charitable deduction), G gifts money to the IIT. G uses his annual exclusion
to avoid gift taxes on this gift. The IIT purchases a life insurance policy on G's life with a face value of $5,000,000. When G
dies, the $5,000,000 worth of bonds in the CRT passes to the
charity. At the same time, the insurance policy in the IIT pays
G's family $5,000,000 cash. The cash payment is income tax-free
to G's family and is not includable in G's estate. G's $5,000,000
worth of XYZ stock has effectively been replaced by $5,000,000
of tax-free cash.
This estate plan is irresistible to many taxpayers because of its taxavoidance capabilities. Some of its benefits include: (1) It provides
the taxpayer with a charitable deduction for a portion of the assets
transferred to the CRT; (2) the taxpayer avoids capital gains tax on
the transferred asset; (3) the value of the appreciated asset is not decreased by taxes so that the donor receives an income stream from the
asset based on its full value, not its value less taxes; (4) the life insurance proceeds are not includable in the transferor's estate and thus
escape estate tax; (5) the transferor's estate is not diminished by estate
taxes; (6) the transferor retains an income stream during his lifetime;
and (7) the transferor can fulfill a charitable inclination without disinheriting his family.
While these benefits are wonderful for the taxpayer, they illustrate that the transfer tax system gives taxpayers an incentive to make
investment decisions that they otherwise would not make. 5 3 For ex153 A slight change in this example also illustrates that the transfer tax can create
liquidity problems for taxpayers with closely held businesses. Assume that G did not
own $5,000,000 worth of XYZ stock, but instead owned a business worth $5,000,000.
If G simply transferred this business to his children upon his death, then the children
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ample, G in the example above had no desire to sell his XYZ stock.
He was motivated to sell it simply because he could avoid taxes if he
did so. Furthermore, the CRT only invested in bonds because they
produced a steady income stream that could be used to fund the
other tax-avoiding trust, the IIT. Finally, the IIT did not choose to
invest in life insurance because it was the most profitable investment,
but because it helped to avoid estate taxes. Thus, the federal transfer
tax system, rather than the market, forced each one of these investment decisions. This is inefficient. The repeal of the federal transfer
tax system would obviate the need for such estate planning tools and
return investment decision making to its rightful place-the market.
III.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE ABOLITION OF FEDERAL TRANSFER

TAXES

A.

The Federal Transfer Tax Is A Source Of Revenue That Should
Not Be Abandoned In a Debt Crisis

One argument for keeping federal transfer taxes is that, given
America's massive debt, it cannot afford to lose any source of revenue.'5 4 America's national debt is almost four trillion dollars and
is increasing by more than one billion dollars per day.' 55 The interest alone on that debt will top $310 billion in 1993.156 Likewise,
for the first time in America's history, interest will be the largest
federal expenditure in 1994.157 Each American man, woman, and
child owes sixteen thousand dollars towards this mountain of
debt. 5 ' These startling statistics, some would assert, provide a
compelling argument for maintaining the transfer tax system and
its $11 billion revenue source.
While federal transfer taxes clearly do raise some revenue, this
might have to liquidate the business in order to pay the estate tax of $2,275,800
(I.R.C. § 2001). While I.R.C. § 6166 attempts to mitigate these liquidity problems,. it is
often not enough. Thus, taxpayers with closely-held businesses often use this estate

plan and simply donate their business to the CRT, which then liquidates the business
to fund the IT. The estate tax's interference with private economic decisions rears its
ugly head again.
154 See generallyJatscher, supra note 23, at 41; Verbit, supa note 2, at 609-11 (arguing

that Congress should restore revenue raising as the primary goal of federal transfer
taxes).

The justification for President Clinton's recent increase in the transfer tax rates is
"the need for all taxpayers to contribute to the current deficit situation." See Entin,
supra note 102 (citation omitted).
155 138 CONG. REc. S7733-35 (daily ed. June 19, 1992) (statement of Sen. Heflin).
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
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feature alone is not a compelling justification for continuing the
tax. All taxes raise revenue, yet not all taxes are justifiable. Simply
put, one should not use revenue raising blinders in evaluating a
tax, but instead should evaluate a tax's broader ramifications. The
revenue that transfer taxes raise is relatively insignificant (less then
one percent of the federal budget) while its costs are significant
(estimated at sixty-five percent of the revenue raised)."' The tax's
complexity renders everyone but transfer tax specialists incapable
of understanding it. 160 The tax is avoidable and thus serves only to
punish those who do not pay high-priced estate planners. 161 The
tax interferes with efficient economic decision-making and is a
drag on the economy.1 6 2 Thus, just because the tax raises $11 billion in a debt-ridden economy, it is not necessarily worth keeping.
Surely there must be a simpler, more efficient, and less
costly
163
method for the federal government to raise $11 billion.
Most important, Wagner's econometric analysis demonstrates
that repealing the burdensome federal transfer tax system will
boost the economy and thereby increase tax revenues. 6 4 Theoretically, then, no revenue substitute would be needed if the transfer
tax was repealed. Practically, however, all proposed tax bills must
be "revenue neutral."1 6 5 Accordingly, a proposal to repeal federal
transfer taxes must be accompanied by a proposal for an alterna166
tive revenue source.
A recent scholarly debate between Professors Charles Galvin
and Robert Smith addressed the issue of replacing transfer tax rev159 See discussion supra notes 23-30 and 52-85 and accompanying text.
160 See discussion supra notes 130-45 and accompanying text.
161 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
162 See WAGNER, supra note 81, at 26; see also discussion supra notes 95-129 and accompanying text.
163 The government does not need to raise $11 billion to replace the revenue from
the federal transfer tax. The government should calculate the tax's costs and subtract
those from the $11 billion figure to determine the tax's net revenue. A new tax
should only replace this net revenue figure. Of course, in estimating revenue from a
new tax, the government should only consider the potential net revenue.
164 WAGNER, supra note 81, at 18-20.
165 See, e.g., Omnibus Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
§ 6401, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990).

166 But see WAGNER, supranote 81, at 26. Wagner argues that repealing the federal

transfer taxes, which have such great social and economic costs, will eventually generate more revenue for the government. As the discussion of his proposals above indicates, Wagner believes that repealing the transfer tax will create jobs for taxpayers
which, in turn, will cause those taxpayers to pay more taxes. While I cannot vouch for
Wagner's econometric model, I fully support his reasoning. It is a shame that Congress does not truly consider the economic effects of its taxes when determining what
.revenue neutral" means.
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enues with an alternative revenue source.' 6 7 While both agree that
the federal transfer tax system should be abolished, they disagree
on how to replace the revenue.1 68 Galvin argues that the revenue
should be replaced by one or both of the following changes in the
income tax system: (a) the recognition of gain (or loss) at the time
of gift or at death; or (b) the inclusion in income of gifts, devises,
bequests, or inheritances by the recipient-i.e., repealing I.R.C.
§102.169 Under proposal (a), an income tax would be imposed on
the gains. 7 ' This tax would be paid by the transferor if the transfer were made during lifetime and by the estate if the transfer were
made at death.1 7 1 Under proposal (b), the recipient would simply
include the value of lifetime gifts and testamentary transfers in
17 2
gross income and pay income tax on those amounts.
Galvin asserts that recognizing gain (or loss) at the time of gift
or death comports with the basic income tax principle that taxes
should be imposed on those who earn income. 17 Thus, he argues
1 74
that this proposal attributes gain or loss to the proper taxpayer.
Galvin supports his alternative proposal-repealing I.R.C. §102by stating that in a pure accretion system based on the HaigSimons definition of income, the receipt of gifts and bequests
should be a taxable event. 175 Galvin projects that either proposal
will more than compensate for the $11 billion revenue loss from
the transfer tax repeal. 176 Finally, Galvin notes that America is
moving towards a comprehensive tax base that more nearly conforms to the Haig-Simon principles, and that his proposals are
See Smith, supra note 4; Galvin, supra note 4.
Id.
169 Galvin, supranote 4, at 1414. Like Galvin, Professor Lawrence Zelenak also proposes taxing gains at death. Zelenak, supra note 17, at 287. But cf. Samelson, supra
note 17, at 703 (criticizing Zelenak's proposals as understating valuation problems
and liquidity problems if gains were taxed at death).
Professor Marjorie Kornhauser also has written an excellent article on the constitutional implications of taxing gifts as income. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REv. 1, 54-55
(1992) (proposing, among other things, repealing I.R.C. § 102 and thus including
gifts in the donee's income).
170 Galvin, supra note 4, at 1414-15.
167
168

171

Id.

172
173

Id. at 1416-17.
Id. at 1418.

174

Id.

Id. at 1419.
Id. Galvin projects that recognizing gains and losses on lifetime and deathtime
transfers-alternative (a)-will raise $14.5 billion. He projects that repealing I.R.C.
§ 102 would produce $18 billion in revenue.
175

176
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compatible with that concept.1 77
Smith argues that Galvin's gain recognition proposal would
generate too many valuation contests and that it would perpetuate
the transfer tax system's liquidity problems.1, 78 He also feels that it
would unnecessarily intrude on taxpayers' investment decisions
and, if not restricted, broaden the tax base so much as to be politically infeasible. 1 79 Similarly, Smith argues that Galvin's accession
tax proposal would produce valuation disputes and liquidity
problems, interfere with investment decisions, and incur resistance
from the middle class.18 0
Smith instead proposes raising rates on ordinary and capital
gains, adopting a carryover basis for testamentary transfers, and
structuring the rate increases to impose the tax burden on the
wealthy."' 1 Smith's proposal would increase capital gains rates six
percent and would increase ordinary income rates three percent
for taxpayer's with adjusted gross income exceeding $200,000.182
Galvin replies that it would be more practical and fair to force a
few taxpayers to recognize gains and losses at the time of a transfer
than to impose a tax rate increase on many thousands of taxpayers. 83 Galvin also criticizes Smith's carryover basis proposal by arguing that: (1) it violates the principle that income should be taxed
to the person who earns it; (2) it is not administratively feasible to
trace the basis of all assets transferred; 8 4 and (3) it reopens the
opportunity to abuse generation-skipping transfers to defer tax
indefinitely.85
Both proposals have merit and would likely be an improvement over the current system because neither proposal is as complicated, unfair, economically inefficient, or costly as the current
transfer tax quagmire. However, few proposals could possibly be
worse than the current system, and both of these proposals seem
177 Charles 0. Galvin, Burying the Estate Tax: Keeping Ghouls Out of the Cemetery: A
Reply to ProfessorSmith, 56 TAX NOTES 951, 951-52 (1992).
178 Smith, supra note 4, at 1801-02.
179 Id. at 1802.
180 Id. at 1804.
181 Id. at 1804-05.
182 Id. at 1807. Smith projects that this rate increase would produce $11.5 billion in
revenue-more than replacing the $11 billion that current transfer taxes generates.
183 Galvin, supra note 177, at 953. See also Charles 0. Galvin, More Reasons to Bury the
Estate Tax, 59 TAx NOTES 435 (1993) (arguing that his proposal would have many
advantages if America adopted a consumption tax).
184 In 1976, an attempt was made to give heirs a carryover basis in inherited property. It was retroactively repealed in 1980 in the face of an uproar over tracing
problems. See Samelson, supra note 17, at 703.
185 Id.
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unnecessarily complex. Galvin's proposal does indeed perpetuate
valuation and liquidity problems inherent in the current system.
Smith's proposal, as Galvin notes, does have significant valuation
concerns. There must be a better way to raise $11 billion.
The ideal revenue replacement proposal would: (1) raise $11
billion from the wealthiest Americans; (2) be simple to understand; (3) be horizontally and vertically equitable; (4) be as economically neutral as possible; and (5) be politically feasible. These
requirements necessarily eliminate any additional tax system from
consideration because legislators, taxpayers, professors, students,
and IRS agents would all have to learn a new tax system. That inefficiency is precisely what one is trying to avoid by repealing the
current transfer tax system.
One revenue-replacing proposal that merits consideration is
the creation of a new income tax bracket for taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes of $500,000 or more. In addition, as Smith
suggests, capital gains tax rates could be increased on these individuals. In 1991, there were 170,395 income tax returns filed by taxpayers with adjusted gross income of $500,000 or more.' 8 6 Those
taxpayers reported an aggregate adjusted gross income of
$201,343,252,000.187 Thus, the average adjusted gross income per
return was $1,181,626.53. A higher tax bracket on these individuals, coupled with higher capital gains tax rates on them, could raise
the required $11 billion. 8 8
This proposal satisfies the ideal criteria listed above. First, it
raises $11 billion from the wealthiest Americans-those with an
AGI of $500,000 or more. Second, it is extremely simple to understand because it merely amends the existing income tax brackets
listed in I.R.C. §1 and the capital gains tax rates. Third, it is horizontally equitable because similarly situated taxpayers, those earnEdward B. Gross, Jr., IndividualIncome Tax Returns, PreliminayData, 1991, STAT.
BuLL., vol. 12, no. 4, Spring 1993, at 6. There were 118,840 tax returns
filed by taxpayers with AGI's between $500,000 and $1 million. There were 51,555 tax
returns filed by taxpayers with AGI's exceeding $1 million.
187 Id.
188 Currently, the highest marginal rate is 39.6%. I.R.C. § I (West 1988). I am
uncertain what the proposed marginal rate for taxpayer's with AGI's of $500,000 or
more would have to be to raise $11 billion. I believe it would be approximately 45%.
The precise number is not important for my purposes. I do not aim to calculate the
precise rate which would produce the desired revenue. Instead, I propose to show
how a simple change in the current tax rate structure could produce the $11 billion.
Again, I want to emphasize that I do not believe that a full $11 billion needs to be
raised when the transfer tax is repealed. Shortly after repeal, saving and investment
will increase, capital will be created,jobs will be created, and, thus, new taxpayers will
join the tax rolls and produce revenue for the treasury.
186

OF INCOME
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ing $500,000 or more, are taxed similarly. It is also vertically
equitable because those with a greater ability to pay taxes do pay
more taxes. Fourth, it is arguably more economically neutral than
the existing system, because although it discourages extremely
high-income taxpayers from working and interferes with capital
formation (as do all progressive income taxes), it would not create
a massive disincentive to create capital. Finally, it is politically feasible because middle-income taxpayers will not bear any of the tax
burden of the repeal, and the new higher tax rates on the wealthy
are harder to avoid. Likewise, ultra-wealthy Americans will be
pleased because: (1) they will never have to pay their high-priced
estate planners, accountants, and appraisers to devise a scheme to
avoid transfer taxes; (2) they will never have to pay a federal transfer tax; and (3) they can be secure that their wealth will pass to
their loved ones undiminished.
There are other proposals to replace the $11 billion in lost
revenue without the adverse effects of the transfer tax system. 189
The point of this Article is not to devise the best revenue-replacing
method. Rather, it is to show that the transfer tax system is a colossal waste of time and money and that simpler, fairer, more efficient
methods of raising that money do exist. Which is the best revenue
replacement method is a topic for another paper. That decision,
as Professor Galvin aptly notes, must be compatible with the overall
tax system, and thus necessarily hinges on the direction of income
tax reform. One thing, however, should be clear: better revenue
sources do exist to replace the $11 billion allegedly lost from the
transfer tax repeal.
B.

Repealing The Federal Transfer Taxes Will Make The Overall Tax
System More Regressive

Another argument against repealing federal transfer taxes is
that they are a mechanism for achieving progressivity, and thus
without them the overall tax system will become more regressive. 90
This argument requires three logical steps, according to Professor
189 See Donaldson, supra note 4, at 540 (suggesting an accessions tax). Other possible proposals include eliminating Social Security payments to taxpayers making over a
threshold amount, or simply increasing sin taxes.
190 Graetz, supra note 3, at 273. Graetz theorizes that "[t]he principal reason, therefore, to revise the estate tax is to rescue this mechanism for achieving progressivity,
and perhaps to rescue progressivity itself, from both short- and long-term threats."
Id.; see also CAMPFIELD ET AL, supra note 6, at 20 (quoting William Pedrick, Through the
Glass Darkly: Transfer Taxes Tomorrow, 19 INST. ON Es-r. PL.AN. 1902, 1902.2 (1985)
(asserting that "the estate and gift taxes have and can contribute significantly to the
progressive nature of our revenue system-of taxing on the basis of ability to pay")).
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Graetz, its chief proponent: "(1) a judgment that progressivity in
taxation is just and therefore good; (2) a view that the estate tax
can and should play an important role in achieving progressivity;
and (3) a conclusion that progressivity should not be abandoned
because of the adverse impact of progressive taxation in general
(and the estate tax in particular) on capital formation." '9 '
A close examination of estate tax data indicates that Graetz's
conclusion is implausible. First, assume that Graetz is correct and
that progressivity is a good thing (although it is an "uneasy
case") .92 Graetz then claims that the estate tax plays an important
role in achieving progressivity.' 9 3 This could not possibly be true
because federal transfer taxes affect an extremely small percentage
of the population and raise precious little revenue.
For example, there were only 53,576 federal estate tax returns
filed with gross estates at or above the $600,000 filing requirement
in 1991.1" Those taxpayers ultimately paid $9,100,290,000 in estate taxes. 19 5 In contrast, there were 114,926,084 income tax returns filed in 1991.196 Those returns reported an adjusted gross
income of $3,471,537,352,000 and incurred a total tax liability of
$470,113,987,000. 197 Thus, estate tax revenue was approximately
two percent of income tax revenue in 1991.198 A tax that affects
such a small number of taxpayers (less than 0.5% of income tax
filers) and raises so little revenue in comparison to income taxes
cannot possibly affect the progressivity of the overall tax system.
Even if Graetz is right and estate taxes promote progressivity in the
191 Graetz, supra note 3, at 273.
192 See id. at 274 n.103 (citing W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSrVE TAXATION (1953)). Graetz defends progressive taxation by questioning the
central premise of progressive taxation detractors. That premise, he argues, is that
earnings in a market economy are not only a necessary concession to economic efficiency but are the morally appropriate rewards to either the owner of capital or the
laborer. These individuals conclude from that premise, Graetz contends, that income
and wealth are manifestations of merit and should not be taxed to fund spending on
public goods or redistribution. Graetz asserts that the market's distribution is not
ethical, fair, nor just because: (1) the rewards depend on factors beyond an individual's control; (2) production is based on the joint use of resources provided by different people, notjust one person; (3) some share of total market return can be ascribed
to society, not to an individual; and (4) many returns to capital and labor are affected
by accidents or luck. Id. at 273-76.
193 Id. at 285.
194 Johnson, supra note 27, at 76.
195 Id. at 91.
196 Gross, supra note 186, at 16.
197 Id. at 16, 22.
198 1 arrive at this figure by dividing $9,100,290,000 into $470,113,987,000
(0.01936).
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overall tax system, he overstates the effect, which could only be
negligible. That negligible effect surely is not a justification for
maintaining a tax system which does not raise significant amounts
of revenue, does not effectively decentralize wealth, does not effectively redistribute wealth, is not cost-effective, is not easily understandable, but does interfere with the economy.
C.

The Federal Transfer System Provides An Important Signaling Effect
That Wealthy People Are Being Taxed

Some might argue that federal transfer taxes should not be
repealed because they foster the important perception that the tax
system is fair. 199 The premise of this argument is that federal transfer taxes provide a backstop to the federal income tax system by
taxing wealth that escapes the income tax . 2 0 Some argue that it is
essential to taxpayer morale that wealthy individuals who have escaped the income tax cannot escape the transfer tax. 20 1 Thus, according to this argument, the amount of revenue that the transfer
tax system generates is irrelevant. The important thing is that the
tax provides a signaling effect to the public that wealthy people are
paying their fair share of taxes.20 2
This argument misreads the signal that the federal transfer tax
system sends to the public. Presumably, the public knows that the
federal transfer taxes are avoidable. Bookstore shelves are packed
20 3
with books such as How To Save A Fortune On Your Estate Taxes.
199 See generally, Daniel Shaviro, Perception, Reality, and Strategy: The New Alternative
Minimum Tax, TAXES, Feb. 1991, at 91. Shaviro criticizes the alternative minimum
tax's goal of "establish[ing] a public perception that the federal income tax fundamentally had become fair." Id. at 98. Similarly, one could argue that a purpose of
federal transfer taxes is to establish a public perception that the federal income tax is
fair by taxing wealth that escaped the income tax.
200 This argument presumes that the public wants wealth to be taxed. I do not

think that they do. Americans are an optimistic group and believe that they will one
day be wealthy. Graetz, supra note 3, at 285. It is the American dream. When they
achieve that dream, they do not want to give their wealth to the government. George
McGovern learned this lesson the hard way. Id. In his 1972 campaign, he proposed
to confiscate inheritances above $500,000. Verbit, supra note 2, at 615 n.70. His pro-

posal was met with a "national cry of outrage." Id. (citation omitted). Even his press
spokesman acknowledged "it would wipe out the dream factor-every slob in the
street thinks that if he hits the lottery big, he may be able to leave half a million to his
family; it wipes out dreams." Id. (citation omitted). Likewise, in 1982, 64% of Californians voted to repeal the state's inheritance tax. Graetz, supra note 3, at 285. Simply
put, Americans do not want their wealth taxed. As a result, I think that a tax which
signals Americans that their wealth is being taxed is a bad thing.
201 See generally Shaviro, supra note 199, at 95.
202 Id. at 95-96.
203 See generally BARRY KAYE, How To SAvE A FORTUNE ON YOUR ESTATE TAxES

(1993).
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Newspapers are filled with advertisements for free seminars on
avoiding estate taxes. The public must know that wealthy people
use high-priced estate planners to avoid transfer taxes. Thus, the
signal that the public receives from an avoidable transfer tax system
is that the system is unfair because the wealthy can avoid taxes
through expert counsel. A taxpayer might be angered by this
avoidance and, in response, be less likely to comply with the income tax. 2 4 Furthermore, as mentioned above, unsophisticated
taxpayers, not understanding the difference between tax avoidance
and tax evasion, might attempt to evade taxes through illegal
means. Thus, the transfer tax system, instead of providing a
healthy signaling effect, might actually decrease taxpayer
compliance.
D.

Wealth Concentration Would Be Even Greater Without The Federal
Transfer Taxes

Another argument opposing transfer tax repeal is that wealth
concentration would increase without transfer taxes. 20 5 This theory contends that transfer taxes have been effective in reducing
wealth concentration, but that the effect is masked by other
forces.20 6 There are two parts to this theory. The first is that
wealth has a natural tendency to increase wealth inequality because
wealthy people save more. 20 7 The fact that wealth concentrations
have remained relatively static, the theory asserts, indicates that the
transfer tax is effectively offsetting this natural tendency.20 8 The
second part of this theory is that social forces (such as the tendency
of wealthy people to intermarry) naturally increase wealth concentration. 2 0 9 Thus, the theory concludes, because wealth concentraSee Dobris, supra note 4, at 1224.
See Verbit, supra note 2, at 602. Verbit explains this argument but ultimately
rejects it. He concludes that "[t]he most that can be said, therefore, is that but for the
present transfer tax system, the percentage of wealth in the hands of the top five
percent of the population would be increasing at an additional rate of less than 0.5%
per year." Id. at 607.
206 Id. at 602.
207 Id. Verbit explains this theory extremely well. Basically, he shows how proponents of this theory argue that savings rates increase as income and wealth increase.
They argue that this increased savings lays a foundation for a second layer of wealth
inequality. They believe that capital, the product of this increased savings and investment, grows faster than capital produced through labor. Thus, the rich get richer.
Id.
208 Id. As Verbit asserts, proponents of this theory find the constant percentage of
wealth held by the richest Americans a cause for celebration, not despair.
209 Id. at 607. Verbit cites to an empirical study on Alan Blinder's theory of how
mating habits relate to the disposition of the family fortune. Id. (citation omitted).
204
205
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tion has been relatively stable, transfer taxes have been an effective
offset to these natural social forces.2 1
Both of these theories, while interesting, are misguided. If
either of these arguments were true, then one should find that
wealth concentration was increasing before the advent of the transfer taxes.2 1 1 One should also find that the implementation of the
transfer taxes slowed the natural tendency of wealth becoming
more concentrated. Neither of these suppositions is true. Actually, the decline in wealth concentration came before collections
from the transfer tax system were significant. 2 12 For example, the
largest drop in wealth concentration occurred between 1926 and
1933.213 In 1926, transfer tax receipts were $60 million; they fell to
a paltry $29.6 million in 1933.214 During this same period of insignificant transfer tax collections, wealth held by the top 0.5% plummeted from 30% to 25%.215 Thus, the largest drop in wealth
concentration occurred before transfer taxes were significant.
Likewise, wealth held by the richest 0.5% of the population has
2 16
actually increased to 28.8% despite transfer taxes.
Furthermore, this theory is flawed because transfer tax collections are too small to have a significant effect on wealth concentration. As stated earlier, the top wealthholders, representing less
than two percent of the American population, hold more than $4.8
trillion in wealth. 2 17 Federal transfer taxes collect approximately
$11 billion annually. 218 Thus, federal transfer tax collections
amount to 0.23% of the top wealthholder's wealth.2 1 9 One cannot
seriously argue that but for a transfer tax system affecting 0.23% of
210 Id. at 607-08.
211 Remember that these theories conclude that transfer taxes do affect wealth concentration, but that the effect is simply masked by other forces. Thus, my point is that

if they are correct, then wealth concentration would be increasing were it not for
wealth transfer taxes. I want to reiterate my position that I do not believe that transfer
taxes affect wealth concentration.
212 Verbit, supra note 2, at 602-04. Verbit uses a chart to indicate the "Share of
Wealth Held by Richest 0.5 Percent of Population" in order to show that the major
decline in wealth concentration occurred before estate tax collections became significant. Id. at 602.
213 Id. at 606.
214 Id. While the fall in revenue coincided with the Great Depression, it also resulted from revisions in the rate structure by then Secretary of the Treasury Andrew
Mellon. Id.
215 Id.
216 See discussion supra notes 31-51 and accompanying text.
217

Id.

218

See discussion supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
arrive at this figure by dividing $11 billion into $4.8 trillion (.00229).

219 1
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the top wealthholder's wealth, that wealth concentration would be
significantly different than it is today.
E.

The Federal Transfer Tax Fosters Dynamic Mobility And Helps
Churn The Economy

Some argue that the federal transfer tax system is worth keeping because it helps to churn the economy.2 20 Proponents of this
theory argue that the transfer tax system helps to make society
more open to economic opportunity because it helps to prevent
"economic status being determined from birth."22 Thus, it gives
those of modest means an incentive to become wealthy which, in
turn, churns the economy. 2 22 Professor William Pedrick best sum-

marizes this theory:
Families that pay substantial transfer taxes may bring home to
the inheriting generation that there is work to be done if the
family fortune is to be restored. And opening new places on the
Forbes honor roll should spur those whose goal is generation of
great wealth. So the estate and gift tax can be seen as the handeconomy accelerating the "churning namaiden of the dynamic223
ture" of our economy.
This theory overstates the deconcentration effect of the tax and misconstrues its incentives. First, transfer taxes do almost nothing to ensure that economic status is not determined at birth. As discussed
above, empirical evidence shows that transfer taxes at best have a negligible effect on wealth concentration.2 2 4 Thus, they cannot possibly
open new places on the Forbes honor role. Second, the argument
that heavily taxing wealth transfers creates a greater incentive for people to work hard and become wealthy is backwards. Families coming
home to the inheriting generation with less wealth after substantial
transfer taxes does not instill in their children the notion that one
must work hard to keep one's wealth. Instead, it makes the children
ask why one would work so hard if the fruits of one's labor will be
taken away. Essentially, then, substantial transfer taxes create a disincentive to work, not an incentive.
1133 (quoting William Pedrick, Through the
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F. Federal Transfer Taxes Are A Moral Obligation Of The Wealthy To
Assist The Poor
Professor Pedrick also justifies the transfer tax system by arguing that it is morally imperative. 25 He argues that "there is a moral
obligation on the affluent to assist the poor-through tax policies
designed to carry out that obligation."2 2 6 Pedrick cites to the First
Draft of the U.S. Bishop's Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy. 227 The Letter advocates a progressive
tax system and argues that everyone has a "right to have a share of
earthly goods sufficient for oneself and one's family" and that this
"establishes a strong presumption against inequality of income or
wealth as long as there are poor, hungry, and homeless people in
our midst."2 28 Pedrick concludes by rhetorically asking: "Do not
accepted moral principles call for continuing and strengthening
the death tax system?"22' 9
No, they do not. While a moral obligation to help the poor
clearly exists, it does not follow that transfer taxes fulfill that obligation. Even if the government should be legislating morality by redistributing wealth (and that is a debatable proposition), transfer
taxes are an ineffective method of doing so. As shown above, transfer taxes not only do little to redistribute wealth, but they interfere
with capital formation and therefore with job creation.2 30 As Wagner's econometric model illustrated, repealing the transfer tax reform would most benefit the poor by creating more jobs. 23 1 If the
government truly wants to meet a moral obligation to help the
poor, then it need only step aside and let the free market work.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The federal transfer tax should be repealed. The federal
transfer tax does not raise significant amounts of revenue, does not
decentralize wealth, does not redistribute wealth and is not costeffective, horizontally or vertically equitable, economically neutral,
nor simple. It interferes with capital formation and job creation.
Furthermore, despite its proponents' impassioned arguments, it
225 CAMPFIELD ET AL, supra note 6, at
1133 (quoting William Pedrick, Through the
Glass Darkly: Transfer Taxes Tomorrow, 19 INST. ON Esr. PLAN.
1902,
1903.2
(1985)).
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does not significantly increase progressivity in the tax system, it
does not provide an important signaling effect, it does not churn
the economy, and it is not morally imperative.
While some argue that America's debt crisis means that
America cannot afford to repeal the tax, the truth is that America
cannot afford to keep the tax. Econometric models show that the
transfer tax costs America thousands ofjobs, millions in capital creation, and billions in Gross Domestic Product. Furthermore, those
models show that repealing the tax will actually increase, not decrease, federal revenues through increased capital and job creation. Even if one rejects that argument, the revenue can be
replaced with fairer, simpler, and more economically neutral taxes.
The tremendous direct and indirect costs that the tax imposes are
not worth the relatively little revenue that it raises. America can no
longer afford the federal transfer tax system and its deleterious
effects.

